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The contribution Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2008) has argued that “the rich” do not pay taxes 
adequately in relation to their income, finding, for instance, an effective tax rate of only 
38.1% for the 0.001% fractile of German income taxpayers in 2001. This result contrasts 
sharply with the legislated top marginal income tax rate of 48.5%. We subject the results 
contained in Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2008) to a rigorous analysis: We find major flaws 
and inconsistencies with regard to methodology, i.e. the omission of corporate taxes and inter-
temporal aspects of taxation. Restating basic rules for the measurement of effective tax rates, 
we provide values for what we term the “comprehensive nominal tax rate” (CNTR) and show 
that the headline result in Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2008) of 38.1% is underestimated by 
over 12 percentage points. As an important distributional result, the CNTR increases with 
increasing taxable income. 
JEL Code: D31, H00, H24, H25. 
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1. Introduction
Discussions concerning the taxation of \the rich" have dominated the German political
and social landscape for a long time. The perception that \the rich" do not adequately
contribute their share to the public nances is deep-rooted, yet scientic tests of this
presumption are quite rare. The contribution by Bach, Corneo and Steiner (2008)
1 con-
stitutes an attempt to add to the public discourse by calculating the tax burden weighing
on \the income rich" in the years 1992 to 2002. To this end, BCS employ a dataset
merged from the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP), provided by the DIW, Berlin,
and the whole population of income tax returns for Germany for the years 1992, 1995,
1998, 2001 and 2002. Their major nding is an \eective average income tax rate of the
German economic elite { the top 0.001% quantile of the gross income distribution { ...
(of) about 34 percent, which is well below the legislated tax rate." They also report sig-
nicant variation over time, with the rate ranging from a low in 1995 of 31% to a high in
1998 of 45%. Similar results are reported for the top 0.0001% quantile where the average
income tax rate drops to only 32.0% for 2002 (BCS, p. 17).
While this result seems shocking at rst blush and might lead one to conclude that the
superrich are not contributing adequately to the German tax base, we discuss possible
reasons for it and provide appropriate remedies. BCS restrict their analyses to the income
tax burden. Yet, while some economic activities, e.g. workers' labor supply, are subject
to personal income taxation alone, this is not true for the case of income from business
activity where both the local trade tax and, for incorporated businesses, the corporation
tax reduce the sole destination of earnings, the consumption of a natural person. As it
happens, the top 0.001% quantile
2 of the German taxpayers derive their major earnings
stream from business activity (68.84% of adjusted gross income) while fully 94.96% report
any earnings from this source.
BCS conduct their analysis with regard to a single year { necessitated by the lack of
panel data sets covering taxation in Germany { and thus neglect the inter-temporal as-
pect of economic activities that investment theory is imbued with. This point is made all
the more poignant as the inter-temporal aspect of taxation \creeps in through the back-
door": German Income Tax Law allows taxpayers to conduct unlimited carry-forwards
and limited carry-backs of tax losses, which BCS completely ignore. If carry-forwards and
carry-backs lower the tax payments due in the year under examination but are disregarded
for purposes of the income tax burden attributed to this year, the resulting number is
biased toward an articially low tax rate.
Furthermore, BCS interpret the deduction of capital expenses and accruals, i.e. the
transformation of cash ows into tax bases, as \loopholes". The term \loophole" is
also applied to the losses resulting from the income type \renting and leasing" which is
subsequently truncated arbitrarily at {5.000 e. In the same vein, BCS attempt to explain
the astonishingly low tax rates that they nd with reference to terms such as \loophole",
which appears ve times throughout the text, \tax base erosion" (twelve appearances)
and \tax avoidance" (nine appearances).
Additionally, BCS devote an entire section to the denition of an \adjusted gross in-
come" which diers markedly from the legal denition supplied by the income tax code.
1 Henceforth BCS. As there are three almost identical versions of the paper, we cite the most recent and
important discussion paper series where it has been published.
2 Measured by adjusted gross income (dened in section 3.2). Note that jointly ling couples would
count as one unit in this analysis.2 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
It also diverges from the well-established and readily available concept of economic prots
as a measure of economic income. Being derived from investment theory, the notion of
economic prots is based on a multi-period concept. Similarly, the concept of \eective
tax rates" is only rendered meaningful in an inter-temporal perspective.
We thus recap the theory behind the academic concepts applied in BCS. Along the
way, we highlight the instances where these multi-period concepts are not amenable to
cross-sectional, i.e. single period, analyses. A frictionless transfer is not feasible, leading
us to conclude that any tax rate computed on the back of the available data can only
be interpreted as a nominal tax burden. As a prominent example, the apparent rule
that faster depreciation today translates into less depreciation in the next year, serves to
highlight the problematic nature of a single-period view: Eventually, today's lower tax
base catches up with the taxpayer. We tentatively improve on the numbers provided
by BCS, remedying several of the points of critique above and labeling the results as a
\comprehensive nominal tax rate". Ironically, and in contrast to BCS, many publications
concerning business taxation neglect the personal tax and solely integrate the corporate
tax. We reestablish the link between corporate and personal taxation that is quite standard
in modern economic thought. Our argumentation dissects their denition of an \eective
tax rate", where we argue that ultimately, the numerator, the denominator and the number
itself are misleading.
We provide an extensive analysis of \comprehensive nominal tax rates" on the popula-
tion of German taxpayers in 2001. The spotlight put on top incomes by BCS is mirrored
in our analysis. Our tentative measure of a tax rate that explicitly accounts for a com-
prehensive tax burden, encompassing a reasonable denition of pre-tax economic income
and an enlarged set of taxes weighing on it, results in \comprehensive nominal tax rates"
that are up to 12 percentage points higher than the tax rates calculated by BCS. As it
turns out, the nding of a higher tax rate is robust across the entire income distribution
and increases in income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we critically examine the
theoretical approach adopted in BCS. In section 3, we provide an extensive analysis
of \comprehensive nominal tax rates" on top incomes and show that a comprehensive,
bird's eye view of the tax burden for the income rich leads to sharply dierent conclusions.
Section 4 concludes. An Appendix provides additional statistical material.
2. Theoretical Examination of the Approach in BCS
2.1. The BCS Approach
The BCS contribution is part of a broader literature that researches the issues of inequality
and its reduction through government policies, in particular through taxation, and the
degree of \eective progressivity" that the German tax system exhibits. BCS cite most
of these contributions in their chapter 1. The authors themselves have contributed to the
subject matter before, in Bach et al. (2005), with a focus on tax issues, and Bach et al.
(2007), with a focus on the distribution of market incomes. These papers share several
common traits that we subject to a critical examination below, in particular the same
database
3 and the focus on the income tax burden alone
4. The correction for presumed
3 Cf. subsection 3.1.
4 Cf. subsection 2.5.THE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 3
\tax avoidance strategies" or the { arbitrary { truncation of losses from renting and
leasing
5 provide other examples.
Bach et al. (2005, sec. 4.3) also employ the concept of eective tax rates that we
discuss in subsection 2.2. Table 11 in that chapter is quite similar in structure to table
4 of BCS: Both tables consistently nd eective tax rates for the top 1% fractile of the
German income tax population well below the legislated nominal tax rates, leading to the
conclusion \Tax progression is real and strong, although denitely not as strong as the
statutory tax rates would imply." (Bach et al., 2005, p. 24).
2.2. Eective Tax Rates
The development of eective tax rates in the literature was instigated by King and Fuller-
ton (1984) and extended by Devereux and Grith (1999). This strand of the literature
has witnessed huge growth since then (Knirsch, 2007). It is based on the notion that
nominal tax rates as stipulated by tax codes do not adequately express the tax burden
weighing on economic activities. Quite to the contrary, nominal tax rates are meaningless
numbers because they are applied to a tax base that does not coincide with investors'
economic goals. Investment theory is based on the notion of investors' goals dened as
the discounted consumption possibilities created by an investment over and above those
readily available from some standard investment, i.e. a savings account. If the denition
of the tax base in the tax code does not hit these goals but anything other than them,
then the nominal tax rate is no longer a valid expression of the reduction of the degree to
which investor reach their goals after tax. A comparison of nominal tax rates, e.g. across
countries, is consequently not meaningful.
A very general formulation of eective tax rates (ETR) that remedies the aforementioned
deciencies is thus (Niemann et al., 2003)
ETR =
Economic goal before tax { economic goal after tax
Economic goal before tax
=
Tax wedge
Economic goal before tax
. (1)
Importantly, the concept of eective tax rates is inherently designed to address a multi-
period context because it builds on investment theory. Departing from equation (1), the
\economic goal" has been dened in various ways in the literature, e.g. as net present
values, nal values or rates of return as dened by Baldwin (1959). Regardless of the
specic gure employed to calculate equation (1), they all address multi-period contexts.
If this property of eective tax rates is disregarded, the connection to the literature is
severed.
In contrast to the multi-period eective tax rate models, BCS, p. 10 derive their
measure of eective taxation from a single period calculus. Single-period expressions, as
they are typical of cost accounting or producer rents in microeconomic theory, are unlikely
to cover the tax burden on multi-period investments such as real estate or shareholdings
adequately. What would a single-period ETR be able to deliver in terms of information
about tax eects, i.e. tax base, tax rate and time eects? As time eects are by the
nature of the construction of a single-period ETR out of the equation, only tax base and
tax rate eects can be detected.
5 Cf. subsection 2.5.3.4 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
BCS not only deliver one eective tax rate, but rather a whole vector of eective tax
rates over points in time. They dene6 their \eective average tax rate", denoted here as
ETRBCS
t , as the assessed income tax liability (plus solidarity surcharge) paid in time t,
denoted as PITt, divided by the adjusted gross income in t, denoted as AGIt.
Consider AGIt being the economic goal before tax and AGIt PITt being the economic
goal after tax, then ETRBCS











The interpretation of ETRBCS
t cannot be the same as in a multi-period approach as
one year's income is not an economic goal in itself. Therefore, ETRBCS
t delivers a tax rate
that tells us how much in taxes one investor paid in relation to an { imprecise { measure
of income in one year, i.e. an adjusted nominal tax rate.
Furthermore, BCS establish entire time series of ETRs7, which might leave the im-
pression of an inter-temporal perspective being adopted. Crucially, though, the available
micro datasets for Germany do not allow one to track taxpayers' behaviour over time.
Several cross-sectional datasets appended to each other cannot make up for this deciency.
They do not contain unique id variables which could establish a link between them. There
is no mention of this problem in BCS, nor is an idea of how to interpret the varying tax
rates given.
2.3. Dierent Notions of Income
Quite apart from the doubts related to the interpretation of ETRBCS
t as an ETR, the
denition of the income employed to compute this number leads to yet another problem.
Consider for example an individual who purchases 0.5% of the equity of an incorporated
business8 for 100 e. After holding the non-dividend paying stocks for 5 years, it is sold for
a nominal capital gain. Discounting the proceeds of the share sale amounting to 133.82 e
at the prevailing interest rate i = 6%, the investment turns out to be marginal before tax.
Applying the concept of economic prots, the microeconomic view would consider the
individual to have income each year due to an appreciation in each period: with each
passing year, the nal payment in t = 5 draws nearer. In a macroeconomic view, the
national accounts would include this gain in t = 5. The notion of income espoused in the
German tax code, the taxable income (scal view), would lead to zero income since the
German income tax code of 2001 did not tax capital gains from minority shareholdings
that had been realized after the expiration of the speculation period of one year.
The three denitions result in periodical income (economic prot), income at realiza-
tion (national accounts), or in no income at all, as shown in table 1 on the next page.
Adding to the confusion thus created, BCS applied a fourth denition of income, their
adjusted gross income (AGI), that they derived from taxable income9. In microeconomic
approaches, however, the concept of the economic prot is well established and remains
the yardstick for economic income for which the AGI does not even serve as a rough
approximation.
6 BCS, p. 15.
7 Cf. table 4 on page 17.
8 Mainly AGs and GmbHs according to German company law.
9 A detailed discussion of the derivation can be found in subsection 3.2 on page 15.THE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 5
Table 1. Diering Income Denitions
Income according to
t Cashow Economic Prot National Accounts German Tax Law until 2008
0 {100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.00 6.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.00 6.36 0.00 0.00
3 0.00 6.74 0.00 0.00
4 0.00 7.15 0.00 0.00
5 133.82 7.57 33.82 0.00
We now provide a simple numerical example of the time-series behaviour of the single-
period ETRs based on the AGI by BCS and on the economic prot. Given the prominence
accorded to income from renting and leasing, we model a taxpayer over a period of ve
years and highlight the result of a narrow focus on data for one specic year.
Suppose an individual taxpayer invested 1 million e in real estate, where the Income
Tax Code stipulates a straight-line depreciation rate of 2% per year. From the income
tax statistic, we observe the income from renting and leasing. Multiplying this income
with the investor's marginal tax rate gives the personal income tax in t, PITt, which is
attributable to the real estate investment. Adding the depreciation allowances at each
point in time, we can derive the cash ow CFt. At the end of t = 5 the house is sold for
800,000 e, the taxpayer realizes a capital loss of 100,000 e10. The investment's economic
prot, EPt is dened as cash ow in t less economic depreciation. BCS' adjusted gross
income equals the tax base except for losses from renting and leasing exceeding 5,000 e,
which are truncated.
Table 2. Derivation of the Cash Flow
t 1 2 3 4 5
(1) CFt 200.00 0.00 250.00 4.56 800.00
(2) Deprt 20.00 20.00 20,00 20.00 20.00
(3) TaxBaset 180.00 {20.00 230.00 {15.44 {120.00
(4) PITt 75.60 {8.40 96.60 {7.78 {50.40
(5) EPt 60.00 51.60 54.69 42.98 45.28
(6) AGIBCS
t 180.00 {5.00 230.00 {5.00 {105.00
Given the economic prot and the adjusted gross income in each period, we compute
the vectors of ETRs from equation (2):
Table 3. Comparison of Single Period ETRs
t 1 2 3 4 5
(4)/(5) ETREP
t 126.00% {16.28% 176.61% {15.09% {111.30%
(4)/(6) ETRBCS
t 42.00% 168.00% 42.00% 155.60% 48.00%
10 We assume that he can fully oset the loss against other income.6 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
The variation from {111% to 176% of the \ETR" based on the economic prot and
equation (2) indicates the inaccuracy of ETREP
t as a tax burden measure. Applying the
BCS denition of the adjusted gross income to this example results in an \ETR" ranging
from 42% to 168%. Hence, even if one applies the universally accepted measure of the
economic prot, single period ETRs lack any explanatory power. Any deviation from
this concept, such as the adjusted gross income in BCS, does not render the measure
meaningful, either.
By contrast, the ETR based on Baldwin rates of return11 delivers an ETR of 44.48%,
indicating that the real estate investment carries a higher tax burden than the alterna-
tive investment since the present value of the economic depreciation is higher than the
present value of the deduction allowed by x 7 (4) of the German Income Tax Code. This
interpretation would not have been possible with any of the single period \ETRs" as they
cannot account for time eects.
2.4. The Relation between Economic Income and Taxable Income
The numerical example above has shown that the economic prot and the tax base dier
at each point in time and in their time series behaviour. This section discusses the
restrictions under which the economic prot can be derived from the taxable income in
a single period context and how the resulting single period ETRs can be interpreted. If
these restrictions held, then we could use the available cross-sectional data to compute
the taxpayer's economic prot and interpret the resulting number.
Consider the earnings E
t as well as the expense A
t to be constant and to be dierent
from the incoming payments Et and the outgoing payments At respectively, then the cash
ow and the tax base evolve as:






Under the assumption that the cash ow, the tax base and their components are constant
until innity, the income from the microeconomic view, i.e. the economic prot, is equal
to the cash ow but not necessarily equal to the scal income. Consequently, the tax base
has to be adjusted. The following relation between economic and taxable income has to
hold to validate the interpretation of the outcome from cross-sectional data.
EPt = CFt = TBt + [Et   E

t]   [At   A

t] = const: 8 t (5)
A prominent example for a necessary adjustment is given by the income from dividends
under the half income system where both the earnings and the expenses have to be revised.
At rst, dividends are included with 50% of the gross distribution in the taxable income.
Additionally, the gross dividend is lowered by corporate and local trade tax. Furthermore,
consider this shareholding to be debt-nanced, then only half of the interests paid can be
deducted from the taxable income, while the cash ow was lowered by the full expenses.
Consequently, the earnings side as well as the expense side has to be adjusted in order to
deliver an accurate measure of the economic prot12. Therefore, the taxable dividend has
to be adjusted on the earnings side .
The economic prot can only be derived from the taxable income observed in a cross-
sectional dataset if the following restrictive assumptions hold:
11 The pre-tax net present value is zero in order to allow for any meaningful interpretation.
12 A full overview of adjustments for the individual income fractiles is presented in section 3.2.THE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 7
 Innite time horizon,
 Cash ow is constant over time,
 Tax base is constant over time,
 Incorporated businesses do not retain earnings,
 Economic depreciation is equal to deduction allowed by tax code,
 Accumulated tax burden is known for all income fractiles,
 Origin of foreign income, especially dividends, is known
 Capital gains are not realized, since tax burden on capital gains is not measurable.
If these restrictions held, then the application of equation (2) would deliver a tax rate
which could be interpreted as the comprehensive nominal tax burden of the economic
prot in the examined year.
2.5. The Tax Burden on Economic Activities
2.5.1. Relevant Tax Rules for Incorporated and Unincorporated Business
With regard to the taxes constituting the tax burden on economic activities, gure 1
highlights those central to the main thrust of our argumentation, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the integration of both the personal and the corporate level.
Gross Earnings
Consumption subject to VAT
CorporateTax+
Solidarity Surcharge Local Trade Tax
Income Tax + 






Renting and Leasing, 
Interest
Figure 1. From Gross Economic Activity to Consumption
Each of these taxes comes with its own set of rules concerning the determination of
the tax base and tax rates. A priori, it is not possible to discount any of these taxes
as irrelevant for the measurement of eective taxation13. In particular, the inclusion of
13 The universe of taxes possibly impacting the tax burden on economic activities exceeds the one in
gure 1 and could conceivably include the Value Added Tax and property taxes.8 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
the tax burden on the corporate level is mandatory and largely uncontroversial: While
from a legal standpoint corporate and personal taxes are owed by dierent legal persons,
economists trace prots from their origin on the corporate level to their sole nal destina-
tion: The consumption of an individual or a household. Along the way, taxation reduces
the consumption value repeatedly. For the distributional consequences, it does not matter
what a tax is being called and whether it is collected on the corporate or on the individual
level.
The refusal of BCS to take into account the enlarged universe of taxes depicted in
gure 1 contradicts with the legislator himself: x 35 of the German income tax code
establishes a link between the income tax and the local trade tax, providing a relief
in the former for the burden represented by the latter14. The obvious corollary of this
construction, i.e. that the legislator is aware of the accumulated tax burden established by
both taxes and the possibility of a substitution between them, is turned on its head in BCS:
The relief stipulated in x 35 is incorporated into their calculations, but the concomitant
burden of the local trade tax is ignored.
BCS choose to include the Income Tax15 and the Solidarity Surcharge on the \Personal
Level" in their calculations16. There is no explicit explanation of this restriction, nor is
this choice self-evident in the light of the foregoing discussion. Interestingly, the corporate
level is barely touched upon: The gross dividend before corporation tax is imputed (BCS,
p. 9) rather crudely, neglecting the local trade tax burden17. The more fundamental
decision to omit the corporate level entirely is not made transparent at all and its eect
will be the matter of the following paragraphs.
We show the dimension of the underestimation bias in BCS that can be traced back
to the neglect of the local trade tax. This bias is prevalent for the rich as the top 1%
quantile18 generates 17.89% of their total income from business activity. The income
from unincorporated business is for the top 0.1% quantile the most important income
component with 37.83% of the gross income. This share rises to 68.84% for the top
0.001% quantile and to 78.66% for the top 0.0001% quantile respectively19.
With regard to this point, we provide a comparison of the comprehensive tax burden
and the \narrow tax burden" by BCS for the income from unincorporated businesses in
table 4 on the next page. German income tax law allowed taxpayers to deduct the local
trade tax from its own tax base and from the income tax base until 2007. Depending
on the local municipal rate of the local trade tax, which we x at 400%20, the initial
local trade tax burden, factoring in its deductibility from its own tax base (120), was 20
(16.67%). On the remainder (100), income tax { with 48.5% as the highest marginal rate
14 See table 4 on the facing page.
15 Abbreviated \PIT" in their paper.
16 BCS, p. 15.
17 BCS seem to suggest in their conclusion that a \move from the taxpayer level to the individual level
{ taking household composition into account { ... seems an interesting topic for future research".
18 The quantiles reported in this section refer to the overall amount of income inferred from the almost
30,000,000 German tax returns in 2001.
19 Cf. table 10.
20 This simplication is suspended in our calculations in section 3, in favor of a more detailed estimate
of the applicable municipal rate: We distinguish between the former east and west. A more detailed
analysis on the level of federal states was not allowed by the anonymisation laws.THE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 9
in 2001 { and solidarity surcharge was due (51.17)21. Furthermore, x 35 of the German
income tax code provided for additional lump-sum tax relief with regard to the local trade
tax (9.50).
Table 4. Calculation of Tax Liability for an Unincorporated Business
Our approach BCS
(1) Business Prot=Income 120 100
(2) Local Trade Tax {20 {
(3) Income from Business Activity 100 100
(4) Personal Income Tax1 {51.17 {51.17
(5) Paragraph 351 +9.50 +9.50
(6) After Tax 58.33 58.33
CNTR /ETRBCS 51.39% 41.67%
1Solidarity Surcharge contained in Income Tax Payment as in BCS
From table 4, a tax burden on a business prot of 120 of 61.67 can be inferred, leading to
a comprehensive nominal tax rate (CNTR) of 51.39%. BCS' narrow focus on the income
tax burden alone { without accounting for the local trade tax paid, but factoring in the
tax relief provided for it by x 35 { would calculate a tax burden of 51.17-9.50=41.67 and
come up with an \eective tax rate" of 41.67%, almost ten percentage points lower. The
\true" tax burden of unincorporated business that represents the most important income
source for the rich and superrich is consequently underestimated by BCS. As the observed
income tax liability { including the x 35 oset { constitutes the nominator of their ETR,
the ETR itself is unambigously biased downward. Worse yet, BCS account for the local
trade tax oset in their income tax measure without acknowledging the underlying local
trade tax payment that the oset was supposed to mitigate in the rst place.
In the same vein, the corporate and the local trade tax is omitted when measuring the
tax burden on the income from incorporated business, i.e. income from dividends. The
lower numerator { due to the omission { entails a lower eective tax rate. If we take into
account the empirically observed concentration of shareholdings in the upper quantiles
of the German income distribution, then this eect does not balance out over the entire
distribution; instead it biases the results in favor of the impression that the rich do not
pay taxes adequately as for the income of incorporated business22.
With regard to this point, we compute the resulting bias for distributed prots23. We
integrate the corporate and the personal level into an exemplary calculation for both the
full imputation system (FIS) that was in eect until 2001 and the half income system
(HIS) valid from 2001 to 200724. To explain the structures, table 5 on the next page
21 We omit the liability for church tax in all our calculations.
22 The top 1% quantile received 42.85% of the dividend and interest income in 2001. The income from
dividends and interests represent the second largest income component for the top 0.1% (0.01%)
quantile with 21.22% (27.71%) of gross income. Cf. tables 10 and 11.
23 Consider that a corporation retains earnings. A narrow focus on the personal tax alone would imply
these earnings to be temporarily tax-free, while they are evidently reduced by the local trade tax and
the corporate tax.
24 The dividends taxable in 2001 were taxed in 95.9% of the cases under the full imputation system, in
4.1% of the cases under the half income system. (Source: Income Tax Return (ITR) Data for 2001,
own calculations).10 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
highlights the tax burden for an incorporated business in Germany for both tax systems,
where the distribution, which can be directly derived from the ITR dataset, is exogenously
set to 100 in row 4 in table 5. The relevant income is given in row 1 with the business
prot.
Table 5. Calculation of Tax Liability for an incorporated business under
the German full-imputation system and the German half-income
system, owners in the highest German tax bracket
Our approach BCS
FIS 2001 HIS 2002 FIS 2001 HIS 2002a HIS 2002b
(1) Business Prot 175.57 162.99 146.31 133.33 66.67
(2) Local Trade Tax 29.26 27.16 - - -
(3) Corporation Tax 61.74 35.82 - - -
(3a) Distribution Tax Relief {15.44 - - - -
(4) Distribution 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(5) Tax Base PIT 146.31 50.00 146.31 50.00 50.00
(6) Personal Income Tax 74.86 25.58 74.86 25.58 25.58
(7) Imputation Credit 46.31 - 46.31 - -
(8) After Tax 71.44 74.42 71.44 107.75 41.08
(9) CNTR/ETRBCS 59.31% 54.34% 51.17% 19.19% 38.38%
Note: Solidarity Surcharge contained in income and corporation tax; municipal rate for local trade tax of 400%
If an investor received 100 of dividends, the business prot, i.e. the economic income,
was 175.57. One pays local trade tax (29.26) and corporation tax at a rate of 40% (plus
solidarity surcharge) for retained earnings (61.74). When the prot is distributed, the
corporate tax rate is lowered to 30% and a relief of 15.44 is granted in this case. The
distribution (100) is subject to the personal income tax rate and solidarity surcharge at
a tax base of 146.31 that is equal to the business prot after local trade tax. As the
corporation tax is imputed at a rate of 30%, the individual increases his consumable
amount by 71.44, implying a CNTR of 59.31%. Applying the narrow focus, one neglects
the presence of the local trade tax such that the income is equal to the income tax base
(146.31). The result of this narrow focus is a CNTR (here ETRBCS) of 51.17% which is
well below the true tax burden on prots from incorporated businesses.
For prots that are taxed under the half income system, one pays local trade tax
(27.16) and corporation tax at a rate of 25% plus solidary surcharge (35.82) on the tax
base (135.82) where the local trade tax is deductible as a business expense and from its
own tax base (162.99). The remainder (100) is distributed to owners immediately where
half of the distribution is subject to personal income tax and solidarity surcharge (25.58).
This procedure leaves owners with an after-tax increase in their wealth of 74.42 which
translates into a CNTR of 54.34%.
For the sake of our argument, let us assume that we only focus on the income tax and
adjust the observed income tax base of dividend recipients (row 4) by 4/3, as in BCS, p. 9.
On our adjusted gross income in row 1 we now slap the empirically observed income tax
and solidarity surcharge (25.58) and calculate an ETRBCS of 19.19% or 38.38%, depending
on whether we adjust the distribution in row 4 (100) { as demonstrated in column 3 {
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fashion, BCS underestimate the CNTR by over 8 percentage points for the full imputation
system and by 35.15 or 15.97 percentage points for the half income system, respectively,
depending on the adjustment.
In a nutshell, BCS severely underestimate the CNTR of over half of the income com-
ponents for the top 0.1% quantile and over 94% for the 0.001% quantile. Furthermore,
the bias increases in 2002 as the share of dividends taxed under the half income system
will be higher than in 2001.
2.5.2. Tax Treatment of Losses
With regard to the tax treatment of losses, inter-temporal and intra-temporal oset mea-
sures must be distinguished. With regard to intra-temporal osets, German tax law
restricted the amount of losses that could be oset between the seven income types men-
tioned in x 2 of the German Income Tax Code to 51,500 e for single lers and 103,000 e
for joint lers. Losses above this level were subject to a limited oset. BCS25 mention
this source of complications but any adjustment mechanism remains undiscussed. The
remaining losses should be factored into both the economic income and the tax liability.
While the income adjustment is rather straightforward, the determination of tax liability
assigned to the examined year cannot be conducted satisfactorily. One would need the
present value of the tax liability reductions due to the remaining losses from the year
under examination accruing in the future. Potentially, this assessment could stretch out
into a very distant future if taxable income for the oset is slow to come by or if the
carry-forward is sizable.
The restrictions only aect 0.05% of the taxpayers with a positive income but it should
be noted that 0.55% of the top 1% quantile is aected with a mean of 3,374,415 e, showing
that the aw in the calculation is more severe for the rich.
Inter-temporal osets were limited to a carry-back to the previous year up to 511,500 e
and unlimited carry-forwards. Bearing these legal rules in mind, the tax payments at-
tributable to a single period must be adjusted. BCS' starting point for computing the
adjusted gross income in t, the overall amount of income (Gesamtbetrag der Eink unfte),
does not include the inter-temporal osets. However, their measure of the assessed income
tax liability in t, i.e. the nominator of ETRBCS
t , is lowered by the inter-temporal loss
deductions while the denominator { the AGI { remains constant. The reduction of the
assessed income tax liability and the nominator, respectively, has to be attributed to the
period when the loss occurred, i.e. to t + 1 or t   x.
In a nutshell, the tax liability attributable to the examined period t is the assessed
income tax liability that would have been due without any inter-temporal loss osets in
t but { as argued above { lowered by the present value of tax liability reductions from
losses that occurred in t but could not be oset in that period.
The following example gives an idea of the degree to which the omission of losses can
bias the CNTR. Assume a (simplied) scenario with four single taxpayers where each
investor has an overall amount of income of 5,000,000 e in 2001. To steer clear of the
complications of taxes other than the income tax, assume that his overall amount of
income consists of wage income only. Investor 1 has neither loss carry-back nor carry-
forwards. Investor 2 suers a loss of 1,000,000 e in 2002, such that he can carry back
511,500 e to 2001. Investor 3 has a loss carry-forward of 1,000,000 e which he fully
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osets in 2001. Investor 4 features both a loss carry-forward of 1,000,000 e and a loss
of 1,000,000 e in 2002 that is carried back to 2001 to the tune of 511,500 e. We now
compute the assessed income tax liability for each investor in 2001 (row 5) and the tax
payment assigned to 2001 (row 6). By dividing row 5 by the income in 2001, one arrives at
ETRBCS. Row 8 delivers the comprehensive nominal tax rate including the tax payment
assigned to 2001 (CNTR2001).
Table 6. The Eect of Inter-temporal Osets on the ETR
Investor 1 2 3 4
(1) Income in 2001 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
(2) Carryback { 511,500 { 511,500
(3) Carryforward { { 1,000,000 1,000,000
(4) Taxable Income 5,000,000 4,488,500 4,000,000 3,488,500
(5) Assessed Income
Tax Liability1 2,537,359 2,275,638 2,025,684 1,763,963
(6) Tax Payment
assigned to 20011 2,537,359 2,537,359 2,537,359 2,537,359
(7)=(5)/(1) ETRBCS 50.75% 45.51% 40.51% 35.28%
(8)=(6)/(1) CNTR2001 50.75% 50.75% 50.75% 50.75%
1Solidarity Surcharge contained in income tax payment
While each investor receives the same income in 2001, ETRBCS varies from 35.28% to
50.75% while the CNTR2001 is actually 50.75% for all four investors. If one raised the loss
carryforward for investor 4, ETRBCS would drop further. The intertemporal loss oset
lowers the assessed income tax liability while the income of 2001 is not touched upon.
But the reduction of the income tax liability cannot be assigned to 2001 since the losses
and the tax reduction must be assigned to the period when the loss occurred. What this
paragraph shows is that it is virtually impossible to disentangle taxpayers' tax aairs and
focus on a single year to assess the cut that taxation takes out of their income.
With regard to the importance of this issue, the inter-temporal loss oset aects 1.38%
of all taxpayers, this proportion rises to 9.38% (13.12% /13.31%) for the top 0.1% (0.01%
/0.001%) quantile with a mean of 1,200,810 e (3,630,884 e/9,019,291 e)26, implying that
the underestimation bias is not uniformly distributed among the taxpayers. It rather
serves to reinforce the impression that the rich are not paying taxes.
2.5.3. Income from renting and leasing
A hazy subject in BCS is the treatment of income from renting and leasing. According
to BCS, \losses from renting and leasing exceeding some thresholds (are disregarded)
since most of these losses are likely to arise from tax avoidance."27 Even disregarding
the status of the term \tax avoidance" (which is customarily used to denote perfectly
legal minimization strategies of one's tax liability, as opposed to criminal \tax evasion"),
26 Cf. table 12.
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and the reasoning provided, the asymmetric truncation of losses from renting and leasing
strikes one as arbitrary.
BCS dwell on this income type extensively and suspect major loopholes for the rich
there. According to the calculations by M uller (2004, p. 77), income from renting and
leasing plays a minor, yet special role in that aggregate income tax revenue from this
income type has been consistently negative over the years. With regard to losses from
this income type, M uller (2004, p. 93) goes on to argue that these are concentrated
in the upper quantiles of the German income distribution. Our analyses show28 that
18.05% of all taxpayers report earnings from renting and leasing. Among these taxpayers,
52.01% report losses. This explains the negative share of -0.14% of the income from
renting and leasing in the overall amount of income. It has to be noted, though, that
1,652,865 taxpayers (32,48% of the reported cases) report losses exceeding 5,000 e such
that the truncation envisioned by BCS becomes relevant. The eects of this { arbitrary {
threshold of 5,000 e on the calculations in BCS are easily explained: the truncation cuts
o the lower tail of the distribution of income from rent and leasing, which { articially
{ increases the mean income from this income type from -687 e to 4.604 e. M uller
(2004, p. 92, Fig. 2.2) draws attention to the extremely uneven distribution of losses
from renting and leasing for the years 1989, 1992 and 1995. The 90 % of taxpayers with
the lowest overall amount of income in the respective year declared less than 60 % of the
entire amount of losses accrued in this income type, while the remaining right tail of the
income distribution declared the missing 40 odd %.
Apart from the arbitrary truncation of losses (which we undo in our calculations in
subsection 3.2), several problems aggravate the calculations envisioned by BCS. Firstly,
it should be borne in mind that real estate management can also be conducted in an un-
incorporated or incorporated business, making any truncation impossible. Furthermore,
any gains or losses from the divestment of real estate would be subject to corporate and
personal taxation. Secondly, the data only record the current returns and deductions,
but exclude any gains or losses realized upon sale of the real estate itself in the income
from renting and leasing. These would show up in the income type \other income" only
if the sale took place within the speculation period29. Since an investor includes both
the returns from renting and the resale price in his calculus, it is impossible to separate
the income from renting and leasing and the attendant gains and losses from sale. The
datasets available for Germany do not allow one to make this connection, though.
With regard to the returns to renting and leasing, the state of the German real estate
market is not easily ascertainable. As is true of any real estate market, transactions are
infrequent and the terms of these transactions are rarely released. Recent years have
witnessed the rst concerted eorts toward the compilation of a price index for real estate
in Germany. Homann and Lorenz (2006, p. 30-36) report several indicators of price
developments for German real estate. While the multitude of indicators reported there
do not give a consistent picture, they certainly refute the notion that outsized gains could
be realized in German real estate in the last two decades. Indeed, government had to
stimulate real estate investments in East Germany to entice investors at the beginning of
the 1990s, where faster depreciation for tax purposes was one of the main instruments.
As the diagrams in Homann and Lorenz (2006, p. 33) show, prices for East German real
28 Cf. table 10.
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estate declined precipitously during the period 1995 to 2005. Given that large-scale pre-
tax gains obviously did not materialise, the claim that income from renting and leasing
has been a \a vast loophole for tax-saving activities in Germany for decades, especially in
the 1990s30" rings hollow31.
So far, we can conclude that not only the measure of eective taxation itself is disputable
but also the denition of the income does not strictly follow any of the three concepts
presented in section 2.3. As BCS also omitted the local trade tax, the corporate tax,
the inter-temporal eects of loss deduction in their computation and regarded economic
losses from renting and leasing as \tax avoidance", the numerator { the taxes paid { as
well as the denominator { the income { are strongly biased. Furthermore, the quotient of
these (biased) numbers cannot be interpreted as a measurement of eective taxation, at
the utmost as a nominal tax burden in one year.
3. Analysis of Eective Tax Rates on Top Incomes
3.1. Description of Available Datasets
BCS describe the components of their dataset and their matching procedure quite ex-
tensively in their chapter 3. The dataset used in BCS is a sample composed of matched
information from the SOEP and the FAST 1992-2001: To overcome deciencies in each
of the two datasets, BCS lump them together to form their \integrated ITR-SOEP data
set". The matching algorithm employed is described in Bach et al. (2007, Appendix 2).
Their rst component, the FAST32 is comprehensively described in Merz et al. (2006).
It is a scientic use le that is collected every three years and contains a 10 % random
sample of tax returns led in the respective year, resulting in approximately 3,000,000
cases out of a population of approximately 30,000,000 tax returns. So far { as of the time
of writing { the data for the years 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001 have been made available. As
a stratied sample, this le contains very precise information for certain minority groups
of the population whose data are consequently anonymised more strongly. In particular,
the right tail of the income distribution is entirely present in the dataset. Overall, more
than 600 variables are contained in the dataset.
The time structure suggested by the triennial compilation process for the FAST does
not imply a panel structure, though. Crucially for the analysis in BCS and ours, the con-
catenation of the four yearly les does not allow one to track taxpayers across time. As an
anonymised and randomised le, information cannot be linked across years. Assessments
of tax burdens are thus only possible for a given individual taxpayer and year.
As an additional crucial hurdle, German Income tax law stipulates the taxation of
accounting prots for certain income types, i.e. income from forestry and agriculture,
income from business activity and self-employment. The process of the determination of
taxable prot is not observable in the data whereas the resulting balance is reported. This
contrasts with the other income types where the determination of their contribution to
the tax base is observable in much greater depth. As a corollary, the presence or absence
of accruals within the reported prots cannot be determined. Any attempt to undo their
30 Emphasis added by the authors.
31 We report empirical results for gains/losses from real estate transactions in table 13.
32 Abbreviation of the German \Faktische Anonymisierung der Steuerstatistik" { De Facto Anonymisa-
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eects is thus doomed.
Regarding the second major data source for BCS, comprehensive information on the
German Socio-Economic Panel, SOEP, compiled by the DIW, Berlin, can be found in
Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 16): \The SOEP was started in 1984 as a longitudinal
survey of private households and persons in the Federal Republic of Germany. The central
aim of this panel study is to collect representative micro-data on persons, households
and families...". It is designed as a yearly sample of the same units (households and
individuals) and thus does allow inference with panel methods. Compared with the FAST
samples, the size of the dataset is more modest, varying between 10,000 and 25,000 due to
the addition of several new subsamples33. On the other hand, the SOEP sample contains
a broader cross-section of individuals as it also contains taxpayers who are not legally
obliged to le tax returns. With regard to tax variables, it is quite apparent that the
SOEP is not designed with the tax researcher in mind and that the tax environment of
the respondents must be inferred in a rather piecemeal fashion and with a relatively high
degree of uncertainty34.
Admittedly, a match with the SOEP could theoretically provide a tentative link across
years which might yield a panel structure. Yet the reasoning for the matching provided
in BCS, p. 6/7 does not mention the panel structure, but is explicitly intended to more
accurately reect conditions in the lower tail of the income distribution.
We tried to replicate this particular dataset as far as possible. Our contract with
the provider of the FAST sample did not allow us to match with another data source,
though. Consequently, we could not work on the same data. Given the high degree of
anonymisation in the right tail of the income distribution prevailing in the FAST dataset,
we ran a controlled data retrieval under the supervision of the statistical oce which gave
us access to the entire population of almost 30,000,000 tax returns (ITR) in Germany in
2001 and 900 variables for each of those35.
The deciency of the missing matching is mitigated because we emphasize the condi-
tions in the right tail of the German Income distribution. As this particular subgroup, the
\target group", is completely represented in our dataset, we can make inferences largely
unperturbed by the missing cases for the left tail of the income distribution. Given that
our (and BCS') main interest lies in the right tail, we can omit the matching from our
analysis36.
3.2. \Adjusted Gross Income" Variable in BCS
BCS devote their section 4 and appendix 2 to the derivation of an \adjusted gross income".
We argue above37 that any attempt to measure the economic prot from the data available
to researchers is severely restricted. Bearing the limitations in mind, we provide our
digest for the derivation of an economically based single-period income. Table 7 displays
33 Cf. Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005, p. 26).
34 Cf. Wagenhals and Buck (2007) for a possible solution.
35 Data handling issues forced us to drop taxpayers with a reported overall amount of income around
0 e. This induced a drop in the sample size to approximately 28,150,000.
36 In any case, the link thus established would be too imsy as the small number of 25,000 units in
the SOEP has to be matched to the approximately 3,000,000/30,000,000 units in the FAST/ITR. On
average, each SOEP unit must account for well over 100/1,000 units in the FAST/ITR database.
37 Cf. section 2.4 on page 6.16 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
our adjustments compared to the adjustments by BCS, grouped by the seven income
types recognized under German income tax law. We highlight major deviations from the
methodology in BCS in bold face.
Table 7. Denition of Adjusted Gross Income
Income
from
Adjustments made by BCS Necessary adjustments of the
taxable income
Wages
 Adjustment for employers'
social security contributions
 Allowable expenses excluded
 Social security contributions
for civil servants imputed
 Tax exempt foreign wage
income added
 Adjustment for employers'
social security contributions
 Allowable expenses included
 Social security contributions
for civil servants imputed




 Includes income from




 Tax exempt prots from
outbound business activities
included
 Tax subsidies added
 Income should be adjusted for
\tax expenditures" such as
depreciation, but data is not
available
 Includes income from




 Tax exempt prots from
outbound business activities
included
 Tax subsidies added









 Includes gains from disposal
of enterprises or substantial
shareholdings (Income from
business activity) and of
private investments
(Speculation gains x 23)
 Includes gains from disposal
of enterprises or substainal
shareholdings (Income from
business activity) and of
private investments
(Speculation gains x 23)
 \Tax-Free" capital gains are
added, as far as reportedTHE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 17
Table 7. Denition of Adjusted Gross Income
Income
from





 Saver Allowance added to
income
 Recorded net dividend is
multiplied by 4
3
 Saver Allowance added to
income
 Recorded net dividend under
half income system is
adjusted by corporate tax
and by the local trade tax
 Dividends under full
imputation systems are





 Losses exceeding 5,000 e are
ignored
 Losses from shareholdings of
closed property funds, etc.
exceeding 2,500 e are ignored




 Corrected for the allowance
for taxable pensions from
employment
 Non-taxable share of life
annuity funds is added to
income (70% of the pension)
 Social assistance, housing
benets and other public
transfers are taken from the
SOEP
 Corrected for the allowance
for taxable pensions from
employment
 Non-taxable share of life
annuity funds is not added
to income
 Social assistance, housing
benets and other public
transfers are ignored since




losses occurred in 2001
should be subtracted.
We include the deductible expenses for income from wages, i.e. we do not add these
expenses to the adjusted gross income since for example the costs for training or education
dilute the taxpayer's economic income while also being recognized as tax deductible.
Adding these costs would lead to an overestimation of the adjusted gross income and,
consequently, to an underestimation of the nominal tax burden.
BCS describe a category \business activity" that bundles the prot income types rec-
ognized under German income tax law. Firstly, a line must be drawn between the income
from unincorporated businesses and income from self-employment: The local trade tax
burden is added to the taxable income as shown in table 4 for unincorporated business,
while the self-employed are not subject to this tax. As BCS omit the local trade tax
entirely, this problem does not crop up in their contribution. Secondly, any { putative
{ adjustments for \tax expenditures" cannot be justi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pension reserves or depreciation charges \tax expenditures", without properly explaining
the implications of this classication. From circumstantial evidence, it seems that any
\accruals", i.e. charges that do not coincide with the associated cash ow, are regarded as
\in need of correction". Adding these components to the taxable income would imply a
fundamental aw since the tax expenditures either have already been capital expenditures
{ as in the case of depreciation allowances { or will be wage expenditures in the future {
in the case of pension reserves. As mentioned in subsection 3.1, the prot- and loss state-
ments of the tax balance sheets underlying the income from unincorporated businesses is
not available. Thus, the ability to correct for supposed \loopholes" is restricted by data
availability.
The capital gains from the sale of an enterprise or a substantial shareholding { even
if they are tax-exempted { are added to the speculation gains to form the income from
capital gains. The gains realized from the disposal outside the speculative period are
not included in the taxable income eectuating an underestimation of the adjusted gross
income from capital gains. These gains must be added to the adjusted gross income but
unfortunately they are not observable38. It has to be noted that the \tax-free" capital
gains are far away from being tax-free. Many studies proved that corporate and dividend
taxes reduce the valuation of shares. Thus, the so called \tax-free" capital gains are
already taxed at the corporate and the shareholder level39.
The income from interest and dividends represents another major source of error
in the BCS approach. Firstly, the bundling of this income stream ties together two
heterogeneous sources of income, with dividends carrying a burden from the corporate
level while interest is unencumbered by any prior taxation. While BCS multiply the
recorded net dividend by the factor 1.333 in order to try to account for the corporation
tax under the half income system, they ignore the local trade tax as shown in table 5 for
both the half income system and the full imputation system. Therefore, we adjust the
taxable dividend by adding the local trade tax. Additionally we add the corporation tax
under the half income system. Consistent with BCS, we add the saver allowance to the
income.
For the reasons discussed in subsection 2.5.3, we do not adjust the income from renting
and leasing. The consistently negative income that renting and leasing has delivered
over the last decades indicates that investors suered economic losses. Furthermore, we
do not go along with the practice in BCS of truncating losses for this particular income
type at a threshold of 5,000 e.
We do not match the ITR data and the SOEP datasets, hence in the case of transfer
income, we cannot account for social assistance, housing benets or other public transfers.
This biases the income generally downwards but the eect for the top incomes is negligible
since they are not likely to receive any kind of transfer. In contrast to BCS, we do not add
38 Since the \tax-free" speculation gains are neither reported in the ITR data nor in the SOEP, any
matching process does not help to uncover this aw. With the introduction of the nal withholding
tax in 2009, capital gains from the disposal of shares will be taxed with 25% regardless of the holding
period solving the information problem behind the \tax-free" capital gains.
But, we assume the speculation gains to have minor impact on the income in 2001 and 2002, since
the substantial interest for tax purposes was lowered to 1% in 1999. Furthermore, the stock market
showed rather bad performance in 2001 where the TecDax crashed from over 9,500 points in 2000 to
a minimum 683.82 in 2001 and the DAX fell to its 1998 level.
39 See among others Ball (1984) and Collins and Kemsley (2000).THE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 19
the non-taxable share of life-annuity funds which we regard as a payback of contributions
made.
Finally, losses occurred in 2001 that could not have been oset against other (positive)
sources of income are not integrated in the overall amount of income and thus, should be
recognized in the computation of the economic income. However, as the present value of
tax liability reduction from the remaining losses is not observable, one cannot correctly
account for the inter-temporal eect of the restriction to the intra-temporal loss oset.
Therefore, we cannot adjust for these losses and underestimate the \true" CNTR.
Bearing in mind that the \correct" and representative gure of income can only be
derived from any cross-sectional dataset under the restrictions discussed in section 2.4,
we conclude that our denition of income diers from the adjusted gross income in BCS
for every income type.
3.3. Adjustment for Taxes Paid
In addition to the adjustments enumerated in table 7, we also adjust the numerator in
equation (2) and account for the most important taxes. We detail these corrections in
table 8 which itself mirrors table 7.
Table 8. Adjustments to Recognized Tax Burden
Income
from Necessary adjustments to Recognized Tax Burden
Wages  Accounted for possible taxes paid on foreign wages
Business
Activity
 Taxes paid abroad on tax exempted prots from
outbound business activities included




 Corporate tax and the local trade tax are added to
the PIT for the half income system
 Local trade tax added for the full imputation system
Losses
 Loss carry-forwards used in 2001 and carry-backs
from 2002 lower recorded tax burden in 2001.
Dierence in income tax burden with and without
carryforward and carryback is added.
 Present value of tax reduction from non-deducted
losses occurred in 2001 should lower tax liability.
The adjustment of the recognized tax burden follows a simple rule. If you increase
the taxable income for any income type in order to derive economic income, you have to
account for possible taxes paid on the respective levels. For example, BCS adjust for tax
exempted foreign wages income. If these wages carry a tax burden from abroad then these
taxes must be added to the PIT. The same problem results for tax exempted prots from
outbound business activities with a potential accumulated tax burden. For the correct
adjustment, information on the country of origin, the tax rate and the tax base would be
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For the case of capital gains, the problem of inferring the accumulated tax burden
proves insurmountable. It is neither observable nor measurable with any method as one
would have to compare the pre-tax capital gain with the (observable) after-tax capital
gain. However, several studies prove that capital gains carry a tax burden, as discussed
in the last section.
By contrast, the local trade tax (LTT) and the corporate tax (Corp) paid on the
corporate level can be derived from the information available from the ITR dataset. If an
incorporated business paid out one Euro of dividends under the half income system,
resp. full imputation system, then the prot on the corporate level was 1
(1 Corp)(1 LTT),
resp. 1
1 LTT . Since we adjusted the gross income, we have to adjust the recognized
tax burden by the corporate tax and the local trade tax as well. The accumulated tax
burden from dividend income on the corporate level (ATBDiv), which is added to the
PIT and which is dened as the dierence between the pre-corporate-tax prot and the








(1   Corp)(1   LTT)
(6)
and under the full imputation system respectively as
ATBDiv = 
LTT Div
1   LTT . (7)
Additionally, the local trade tax must be added to the recognized tax burden if a
taxpayer has income from an unincorporated business. We can observe the lump-
sum oset of the local trade tax (Steuererm aigung bei Eink unften aus Gewerbebetrieb)
from x 35 denoted as Ox35. Thus, we derive the taxable business income (Gewerbesteuer-
Messbetrag) by dividing the oset by 1.8. The accumulated tax burden of the income
from an unincorporated income ATBUninc evolves as the product of the taxable business






Losses carried forward to 2001 from prior years and/or losses carried back from 2002 into
2001 impact the tax liability due in 2001 yet leave the adjusted gross income untouched.
A recognition of the tax reduction solely in 2001 would unduly bias the resulting tax rates
downward. For the reasons expounded in subsection 2.5.2, we account for this eect in
the manner described at the bottom of table 8. The present value of the tax liability
reduction from non-deducted losses occurred in 2001 should, but cannot be recognized for
the reasons discussed in subsection 3.2.
Since taxable capital gains from the disposal of enterprises and substantial sharehold-
ings, business activity and dividends represent the major part of the income of the rich
and the super-rich, BCS' measure of \eective taxation" provides an incorrect, downward
biased picture of the \tax burden" of the rich.
40 The index i indicates that we account for regional dierences in the collection rate in 2001. The federal
state of the taxpayer is known from the dataset which allows us to apply the average collection rate
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3.4. Empirical Results
In this section, we provide our results for the cross-section of income tax returns in Ger-
many in 2001. Table 9 shows the mean comprehensive nominal tax rates emanating from
our adjustments, conditional on the quantiles of the income distribution, and the corre-
sponding numbers from BCS, table 4. The last column gives the dierence in percentage
points between the two sets of results. Note that the adjustments in our approach and in
BCS dier in the manner described in table 7 so that the allocation to quantiles may not
coincide perfectly.
Table 9. Comparison of the Comprehensive Nominal Tax Rate and
ETRBCS for 2001
Quantile CNTR ETRBCS =CNTR{ETRBCS
Decile 1-5 3.60% 2.90% 0.70%
Decile 6-9 12.87% 10.10% 2.77%
Decile 10 23.27% 21.90% 1.37%
Top 1% 37.21% 33.40% 3.81%
Top 0.1% 45.25% 38.20% 7.05%
Top 0.01% 48.05% 38.70% 9.35%
Top 0.001% 50.30% 38.10% 12.20%
Top 0.0001% 51.39% 36.00% 15.39%
Source: ITR 2001, own calculationss
Apparently, there is a broad agreement between the results. Within the top 1% quantile,
the results diverge markedly, with the dierences ranging from 3.81 percentage points for
the 1% quantile to 15.39 percentage points for the top 0.0001% quantile. Given the focus
on the taxation of \the rich" in BCS, this development acquires a lot of signicance. As
an explanation for the dierences, we provide table 10 on page 24 which clearly shows
the change in composition in the adjusted sum of income between the quantiles.
Taxpayers below the 90% quantile rely heavily on domestic wage income (84.54% for
the deciles 1-5 and 91.81% for the deciles 6-9 respectively) which is taxed in a cash ow
manner, i.e. in an uncontroversial way which requires very few adjustments. Within the
upper 1% quantile, though, the importance of wage income declines precipitously from
44.22% for the top 1% quantile to 0.27% for the top 0.0001% while business and capital
income assume greater weight. Taxpayers in the top 0.001% (0.0001%) quantile generate
94.24% (99.99%) of their income from capital or business income. These are the income
types where our criticsm of the BCS approach bites most heavily and where consequently
the divergence is greatest.
These results cast grave doubt on the validity of the claim in BCS, p. 17 that \...average
eective tax rates paid by the economic elite..." was 38.1% in 2001. The economic elite {
dened in BCS as the upper 0.001% quantile { actually faced a CNTR of 50.30% which
is over 12 percentage points higher. Bearing all the caveats of our prior analysis in mind,
the CNTRs exceed the top statutory income tax rates by several percentage points across
the board, highlighting the inuence of the local trade tax and the corporation tax on22 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
the overall tax burden. On top of that, the relevance of inter-temporal loss deductions,
depicted in table 12 on page 25, increases with the quantiles, so that the bias arising
from the omission of the losses in BCS also increases.
3.5. Limitations
Concerning the methodology used, we describe additional41 limitations in this section.
As mentioned above, our main interest lies in the right tail of the income distribution.
Note here that we must contend with the fact that the dataset only contains information
pertaining to taxation. The denition of \income rich" should thus be read as \taxable
income rich", subject to the modications that we describe in table 7. Assume, in the
fashion of table 1 on page 5, a taxpayer who makes spectacular gains in real estate and
shares after the expiration of the speculation period of 10, resp. 1 year: if you further
assume that this is his major source of income, he could make millions without the ITR
dataset even noticing him. The particular denition of income dictated by German income
tax law would eectively allow him to \y below the radar". Similarly, if a taxpayer's
assets consisted of a share in an incorporated business and the business retained its entire
earnings for 2001, the taxpayer would be classied as \poor" in the 2001 cross-section
because he does not have taxable income42 in this year. Note how dierently this issue
would be handled under economic income: if the investments enabled by the retention
were protable, an economic appreciation would be due, generating economic income in
the year 2001. Given the inevitable departures of a cross-sectional income denition in
the dataset from economic income stressed throughout our article, the classication of
taxpayers into quantiles based on the \overall amount of income" (Gesamtbetrag der
Eink unfte) is certainly problematic. These problems are shared with BCS and anyone
who makes inferences from tax data.
4. Conclusion
We have provided a comprehensive examination of the most salient and controversial
results in Bach et al. (2008). Our argumentation rests on several layers of critique:
Very fundamentally, we argue that a restriction on the income tax burden has lowered
the \eective tax rates" calculated in BCS by up to 12 percentage points. We replace it
with a comprehensive measure of tax burden and calculate tax rates that are well above
the nominal tax rate. In particular, the omission of the local trade tax and the corporation
tax from the calculations is bound to yield a skewed picture of the nominal tax burden.
Given that income from business activity is concentrated in the upper quantiles of the
income distribution, this omission does not cause a downward shift across all taxpayers,
but an unambiguous bias toward lighter taxation of the rich. We also nd that the
concept of eective tax rates is not applicable, as the very notion of ETRs precludes their
meaningful deployment in a single period calculus. Furthermore, we have questioned the
role of accruals for tax purposes. By their very nature, these items must be interpreted
in an inter-temporal perspective, as they are designed to transform cash ows into tax
41 Note that the main criticism of the BCS approach is contained in section 2.
42 This is true for the purposes of income taxation. Corporation tax is due on the prot, anyway. There
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bases over time. We also nd substantial shortcomings with respect to the treatment of
tax losses, as inter-temporal aspects reassert themselves.
Reassuringly, the ocial tax statistics (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2001, p. 21) for
2001 provide a glimpse at the massive contribution that the income rich make toward
income tax receipts: while the upper 50 % of German income taxpayers contributed over
90 % of income tax receipts in 2001, the upper ten percent contribute over 50 % and the
upper ve percent, the smallest quantile for which these numbers are available for 2001,
chips in 40 odd %.
We have shown that the complaint in BCS, p. 20: \... eective tax progression stops
at income levels within the top percentile, i.e. the eective tax rate is not monotoni-
cally increasing in gross income within the top percentile of the income distribution" is
unsubstantiated and disregards elementary rules for measuring eective tax rates.24 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
Additional Tables
Table 10. Adjusted Income Components As Percentage of Adjusted Sum
of Incomes
Income from:
Quantiles x131 x152 CG3 x184 CG5 x196 x207 x218 x229 CG10 Total
Losses 2.99 42.27 1.34 7.53 0.37 29.81 5.84 17.53 -5.97 7.42 100
Decile 1{5 0.66 3.77 0.10 1.67 0.01 84.54 3.16 {0.05 6.23 {0.05 100
Decile 6{9 0.65 3.91 0.08 1.60 0.01 91.81 1.45 {0.18 0.75 {0.02 100
Decile 10 0.73 8.29 0.46 9.14 0.13 78.03 3.66 {0.40 0.49 {0.08 100
Top 1% 0.82 17.89 2.50 24.63 0.55 44.22 12.31 {0.79 0.72 {0.44 100
Top 0.1% 0.75 37.83 5.75 12.75 0.75 25.09 21.22 0.63 1.46 0.36 100
Top 0.01% 0.36 58.34 12.11 2.81 0.25 10.79 27.71 {2.12 1.89 {0.20 100
Top 0.001% 0.00 68.84 11.36 1.64 0.00 3.04 25.40 0.51 0.58 0.18 100
Top 0.0001% {0.02 78.66 3.89 0.06 0.00 0.27 21.33 {0.30 0.00 {0.43 100
Total 0.66 4.23 0.13 2.37 0.02 85.89 2.50 {0.14 3.43 {0.04 100
Source: ITR 2001, own calculations.
1 Income from Agriculture and Forestry { 2 Income from Unincorporated Business { 3 Capital Gains from x 16 and
17 (included in 2) { 4 Income from Self-Employment { 5 Capital Gains from x 18 (included in 4) 6 Income from
Wages { 7 Income from Capital Income { 8 Income from Renting and Leasing { 9 Other Income { 10 Speculation
Gains (included in 9)
Table 11. Distribution of Adjusted Income Components among Quantiles
Income from:
Quantiles x131 x152 CG3 x184 CG5 x196 x207 x218 x229 CG10 SoI
Losses {1.02 {4.49 1.14 {0.43 0.50 0.15 0.52 61.74 0.97 4.15 {0.32
Decile 1{5 24.80 11.73 7.89 5.73 5.38 23.35 19.02 {17.73 68.37 17.19 22.43
Decile 6{9 43.83 24.95 8.64 16.16 10.76 51.36 19.91 42.33 20.39 21.78 46.36
Decile 10 32.38 67.81 82.32 78.54 83.37 25.13 60.55 13.66 10.28 56.88 31.53
Top 1% 9.88 44.09 71.29 39.49 57.75 4.15 42.85 {21.19 4.04 40.87 9.94
Top 0.1% 3.08 29.42 54.66 6.95 21.03 0.89 25.43 {14.37 1.76 21.71 4.07
Top 0.01% 0.49 15.90 33.03 0.69 2.22 0.16 11.23 {1.53 0.77 1.95 1.69
Top 0.001% {0.01 6.32 9.23 0.13 0.02 0.02 4.26 {0.58 0.27 {2.86 0.62
Top 0.0001% 0.00 1.79 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 0.21 0.00 1.25 0.16
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: ITR 2001, own calculations.
1 Income from Agriculture and Forestry { 2 Income from Unincorporated Business { 3 Capital Gains from x 16 and 17
(included in 2) { 4 Income from Self-Employment { 5 Capital Gains from x 18 (included in 4) 6 Income from Wages {
7 Income from Capital Income { 8 Income from Renting and Leasing { 9 Other Income { 10 Speculation Gains
(included in 9) {  Negative percentage indicates positive income since overall income from renting and leasing and
from speculation gains respectively is negative.THE RICH DEMYSTIFIED 25
Table 12. Relevance of Inter-temporal Loss Deductions
RL x21 Inter-temporal LD2 Total3
Quantiles Total Mean (e) CB CF
Losses 99.51% 0.09% 19,894.51 0.00% 0.09% 99.51%
Decile 1{5 0.04% 1.90% 10,809.46 0.22% 1.69% 4.01%
Decile 6{9 0.03% 0.71% 37,038.94 0.18% 0.53% 0.74%
Decile 10 0.16% 1.57% 187,327.72 0.44% 1.16% 1.06%
1% 0.55% 4.83% 415,176.84 1.34% 3.65% 5.23%
0.1% 0.71% 9.38% 1,200,816.34 2.84% 7.03% 9.86%
0.01% 0.72% 13.12% 3,630,884.23 4.02% 9.97% 13.66%
0.001% 0.00% 13.31% 9,019,291.05 3.60% 11.15% 13.67%
0.0001% 0.00% 22.22% 9,092,094.67 3.70% 18.52% 22.22%
Total 1.09% 1.38% 36,062,25 0.23% 1.16% 2.46%
1 Percentage of taxpayers with remaining non-deducted intratemporal losses of 2001 (x 2 German Tax
Code) { 2 Percentage of taxpayers with intertemporal loss deductions in 2001. Total percentage and
proportion of carrybacks from 2002 (CB) and all carryforwards from prior years reported {
3 Cumulates the cases, where the CNTR is biased either due to a remaining non-deducted
intratemporal loss or an intertemporal loss oset as percentage of all taxpayers.26 MARTIN JACOB, RAINER NIEMANN, AND MARTIN WEISS
Table 13. Reporting Frequency of Income Components
Income from:
Quantiles x131 x152 x183 x194 x205 x216 x22/237
Losses 3.97% 58.18% 11.10% 28.09% 12.42% 41.47% 17.68%
Decile 1{5 1.87% 12.49% 3.46% 82.09% 9.40% 12.73% 21.51%
Decile 6{9 2.27% 12.71% 5.39% 94.82% 9.46% 18.84% 8.38%
Decile 10 2.13% 25.28% 20.21% 89.32% 26.59% 42.11% 7.80%
Top 1% 2.80% 53.36% 38.96% 75.15% 65.09% 72.57% 15.79%
Top 0.1% 4.27% 75.45% 32.63% 69.62% 89.07% 82.65% 23.50%
Top 0.01% 6.99% 89.46% 32.52% 63.32% 94.69% 86.05% 27.50%
Top 0.001% 10.07% 94.96% 46.40% 58.99% 95.32% 87.05% 35.97%
Top 0.0001% 14.81% 96.30% 62.96% 62.96% 96.30% 85.19% 33.33%
Total 2.05% 13.84% 5.88% 87.84% 19.62% 18.05% 14.96%
Thereof Reported Losses
Losses 62.15% 93.38% 77.90% 36.01% 12.17% 85.28% 0.62%
Decile 1{5 12.66% 30.41% 17.25% 0.36% 2.56% 43.03% 0.08%
Decile 6{9 9.65% 25.58% 14.79% 0.02% 5.17% 55.49% 0.42%
Decile 10 13.87% 27.27% 8.97% 0.05% 6.19% 59.65% 2.42%
Top 1% 24.06% 29.63% 5.59% 0.15% 4.54% 58.27% 0.00%
Top 0.1% 39.08% 22.20% 7.60% 0.21% 2.40% 52.08% 2.09%
Top 0.01% 56.92% 13.07% 8.38% 0.17% 2.01% 48.38% 1.96%
Top 0.001% 64.29% 11.36% 3.10% 0.00% 1.51% 46.69% 4.00%
Top 0.0001% 75.00% 7.69% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 60.87% 22.22%
Total 11.47% 28.09% 13.54% 0.18% 2.44% 52.01% 0.28%
Source: ITR 2001, own calculations.
1 Income from Agriculture and Forestry { 2 Income from Unincorporated Business { 3 Income from Self- Employment
{ 4 Income from Wages { 5 Income from Capital Income { 6 Income from Renting and Leasing { 7 Other IncomeREFERENCES 27
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